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NOTE
CIRCUMVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: DOES THE AMERICANS WITH





On September 14, 2000, forty-nine year old Marsha Mason of Rath-
drum, Idaho suffered an acute asthma attack and passed away.' The
Kootenai County Coroner reported that air pollution was a likely factor
in her death.2  The United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") conducted its own investigation into the matter and found that
the burning of 6,522 acres of both the Coeur d'Alene Reservation and the
Rathdrum Prairie the day before had produced extensive emissions of
smoke and particles into the air.' The highest concentration of the smoke
was at approximately 8:00 p.m. on the thirteenth of September and Ms.
Mason died in the early hours of the fourteenth.4
Protecting the quality of human health in modern society places the
governments that create and enforce environmental policies in a precari-
* J.D. Candidate 2002, The Catholic University, Columbus School of Law; B.A.
1993, University of Delaware. The author wishes to thank his family for its never
ending support in the process of writing this Note.
1. Death Prompts Fed to Consider Burning Ban, But EPA Official in Boise
Doubts it Would Help, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 23, 2000, at 2000 WL 28729199.
2. Id.
3. Letter from Charles E. Findley, Acting Regional Administrator, EPA, to
Stephen Allred, Administrator, Idaho Dep't of Envtl. Quality, (Sept. 25, 2000)
(on file with author).
4. Id.
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ous position. The roles and responsibilities of today's government come
into conflict with one another on numerous occasions. One particular
area where these conflicts arise is in the arena of environmental policy.
Policymakers are forced to balance two strong public policy issues: pro-
tecting human health and the environment and encouraging economic
and technological development. To accommodate these competing inter-
ests, many of today's environmental laws and regulations provide for the
limited release of emissions such as smoke particulates and chemicals into
the environment-a necessary concession in the development of the
medical, pharmaceutical, technological, and agricultural advantages of life
in the twenty-first century.
Recognizing the need to protect human health and the environment,
the regulation of releases into the environment occurs within the confines
of federally-determined health standards. These standards take numer-
ous health and technology considerations into account and are based on
the premise that pollution of the air, water, and land increases the risk of
human illness and mortality.' Laws that restrict this pollution begin to re-
duce the risk of illness and death as soon as they are implemented .
Despite the comprehensive rubric of U.S. environmental policy, ad-
verse health effects caused by pollution, particularly air pollution, are a
matter of increasing concern.8 Studies are regularly being released that
5. It is important to note that most environmental statutes expressly involve
the states as partners in environmental protection. For example, under the Clean
Air Act, Congress found "that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or
elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or cre-
ated at the source) and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsi-
bility of the states and local governments." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (1994).
6. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2025 (1999).
7. See id.
8. Issues such as global warming have taken center stage in recent years.
Based on the presumption that global warming is increasing rapidly, scientists are
predicting droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next cen-
tury. It is being projected that Earth's average temperature could rise by as much
as 10.4 degrees over the next one hundred years. These predictions represent the
most rapid change in ten millennia and are more than sixty percent higher than
what scientists predicted six years ago. See THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE AN ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY, (2000), available at
http://www.usgcrp.gov/ipcc/SRs/regional/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
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link environmental air pollution to inauspicious health effects, especially
in children. In one recent study, the emission of air particles by the na-
tion's energy industry was linked to increased risk of death and shortened
life spans.9 According to authors of the study, fine particle pollution from
U.S. power plants cuts short the lives of over 30,000 people each year.10
The study also concludes that power plant particle pollution causes more
than 603,000 asthma attacks per year.1 Another recent study found that
the lung capacity of children living in the most polluted cities is ten per-.• 12
cent lower than those living in less polluted cities. The study purports
that "[c]ommon air pollutants, such as those that lead to the formation of
ozone like hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides, as well as particulate mat-
ter, slow children's lung development over time.... "13 Such studies tend
to raise public consternation that our nation's environmental laws do not
go far enough to protect everyone.
One particular activity currently under fire is the practice of agricul-
tural or crop stubble burning. According to the EPA, stubble burning is
"a land treatment, used under controlled conditions, to accomplish natu-
ral resource management objectives.' 4 The EPA goes on to state that:
Prescribed fire is a cost-effective and ecologically sound tool for
forest, range, and wetland management. Its use reduces the po-
tential for destructive wild fires and thus maintains long-term air
quality. Also, the practice removes logging residues, controls
insects and disease, improves wildlife habitat and forage produc-
9. See CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, DEATH, DISEASE AND DIRTY POWER:
MORTALITY AND HEALTH DAMAGE DUE TO AIR POLLUTION FROM POWER
PLANTS, October 2000, available at http://www.cleantheair.org (last visited Oct. 19,
2000).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 5.
12. See W. James Gauderman et al., Association Between Air Pollution and
Lung Function Growth in Southern California Children, 162 AM. J. OF
RESPIRATORY AND CRITICAL CARE MED., 1383 (2000). 13. Pamela Najor, Chil-
dren Living in Most Polluted Cities Suffer Decreased Lung Function, Study Says,
206 BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 24, 2000, at A-15.
13. Pamela Najor, Children Living in Most Polluted Cities Suffer Decreased
Lung Function, Study Says, 206 BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 24,
2000, at A-15.
14. U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
AGRICULTURALCENTER, AGRICULTURAL BURNING, at http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ag/
tburn.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
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tion, increases water yield, maintains natural succession of plant
communities, and reduces the need for pesticides and herbi-
cides.
The major air pollutant of concern is the smoke produced.
Smoke from prescribed fires is a complex mixture of carbon,
tars, liquids, and different gases.... The major pollutants from
wild land burning are particulate, carbon monoxide and volatile
organics."
The concerns mounting over agricultural burning are the result of its
reported impact on human health. According to the EPA, particulate
matter, the term for solid or liquid particles in the air, can penetrate deep
into the lungs." Due to the severity of the impact that particulate matter
has on individuals, such as the death of Ms. Mason in Rathdrum, Idaho,
stories of persons suffering from agricultural burning practices tend to
resonate with the public. 7
To ensure that activities that release smoke or other emissions into the
environment are within federally-permitted limits, today's environmental
laws contain a plethora of provisions providing legal recourse for viola-
tions. These regulations ensure that such laws are complied with and con-
sistently enforced. Implicit in the development of these laws is the assur-
ance that human health will be protected. The system, however, is not
perfect. For example, vulnerable segments of the population, such as per-
sons suffering from asthma, cystic fibrosis, or other respiratory illnesses,
may have difficulty breathing air that contains particles or chemicals re-.
leased at federally allowable quantities. Furthermore, unless violations of
the respective environmental laws occur, enforcement provisions, includ-
ing citizen suit provisions, tend not to cover adverse impacts caused by the
legal emission of constituents into the environment. But just as our sys-
tem of jurisprudence is in a constant state of evolution, persons with dis-
abilities have discovered a new alternative to possibly redress the individ-
ual and adverse effects of state sanctioned environmental releases-The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 8
15. Id.
16. See id. at 4 ("In recent studies, exposure to particulate pollution either
alone or with other air pollutants - has been linked with premature death, difficult
breathing, aggravated asthma, increased hospital admissions, emergency room vis-
its, and increased respiratory symptoms in children.").
17. See IDAHO STATESMAN, supra note 1.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17, 12201-13 (1994).
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By using the ADA, persons with disabilities are essentially challenging
the utility of existing environmental statutes. The first statute to come
under fire is the Clean Air Act.'9 This Note focuses on how using the
ADA causes serious conflicts with carefully crafted environmental pro-
grams and would set a dangerous precedent ripe for exploitation. Simply
stated, "if... [environmental] activities.., are covered by the ADA, the
failure of any local or state government to guarantee pristine air, by
eliminating all emissions from sources such as automobiles, industrial fa-
cilities, farming, and households, would arguably be a violation of the
ADA."20 Allowing use of the ADA to challenge the state implementation
of federal environmental statutes is unconstitutional and inconsistent with
congressional intent and legal precedent, and its snowball effect could
pollute the courts with challenges to virtually every environmental pro-
gram.
Part I of this Note introduces some basic background and broad themes
covered to better apprise the reader of U.S. environmental laws and their
role in protecting human health. Part II details the specific statutes at is-
sue and analyzes cases that potentially could set a precedent for a new
disabilities cause of action in environmental law. Part III analyzes the ef-
fects of using the ADA to challenge environmental policies. This part re-
lies on the facts of a current case and raises numerous arguments against
the cause of action being pursued. Part IV looks at possible outcomes and
the abuse that would arise should the courts allow ADA causes of action.
This Note concludes with cautions against abuse of this potential new
trend in environmental jurisprudence.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND PRIOR COURSES OF ACTION
Under current environmental policy, every person is entitled to use the
21same avenues to challenge and enforce environmental policies. These
opportunities include challenges arising under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act22 and comprehensive enforcement mechanisms available in
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
20. Elisabeth Frater, Smoking out the Disabilities Act, 32 NAT. J. 3166 (2000).
21. Under the Clean Air Act, "[t]he term person includes an individual, cor-
poration, partnership, association, State, municipality, political subdivision of a
State, and any agency, department, or instrumentality of the United States, and
any officer, agent, or employee thereof.." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1994).
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2000).
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most environmental statutes.23 However, though the ADA provides for
causes of action independent of those found in environmental laws, its use
could heavily impact the way that environmental laws are enforced. To
evaluate the legal issues at hand, a summary of the statutes at issue fol-
lows. Because state programs implementing the Clean Air Act are the
first to come into dispute, a description of the Clean Air Act will serve as
the default environmental statute exemplified in this Note.
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 and it
became effective on January 26, 1991. 24  The ADA was enacted to
"[pirovide a national mandate 'for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.' 25 The Act extends the prohibition of
discrimination in federally assisted programs under section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 197326 to all activities of state and local governments,
regardless of whether they receive federal aid.
The ADA is comprised of five titles. Title I covers employment and
requires businesses to provide reasonable accommodations to protect the
27rights of persons with disabilities in all aspects of employment. This ap-
plies to both physical aspects of the job as well as hiring practices and28
wages. Title 11 addresses public services and states that such services
cannot be denied, and must be accessible to persons with disabilities.
Public services covered include those provided by state and local govern-
ment instrumentalities. Title III requires that public accommodations,
such as buildings, be accessible to individuals with disabilities, and Title
23. The Clean Air Act's enforcement provisions will be summarized and will
serve as an example of similar provisions in other statutes.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
25. Kornblau v. Dade County, 86 F.3d 193, 194 (11th Cir. 1996).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits
discrimination against persons with disabilities by public or private organizations
that receive federal funds. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). Title II of the ADA ex-
tends section 504 to state government and other public entities that do not receive
federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. §12132 (1994). The ADA required the Attorney
General to implement Title II through regulations that are consistent with section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (1994).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
28. See id.
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994).
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IV specifically requires that telecommunications companies providing
service to the public have devices for use by the deaf.30 Title V is a miscel-
laneous section that includes provisions prohibiting the coercion or
threatening or retaliating against the disabled or those attempting to aid
persons with disabilities.31 The Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the
ADA's main implementing and enforcement body, has indicated that en-
tities are forbidden from denying a disabled person "the opportunity to
participate in services, programs or activities that are not separate or dif-
ferent despite the existence of permissibly separate or different programs
or activities., 32 Each title of the ADA provides an important shield for
persons with disabilities. However, Title II is also being used as a sword.
Persons with disabilities have found that Title II of the ADA may serve
as a vehicle to challenge environmental and health law. Title II states that
"no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services,
programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity., 33 Courts have indicated that a showing of intentional
discrimination is not necessary to sustain a Title II ADA claim.34 The
scope of covered activities is also very broad. The ADA's legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress chose "[n]ot to list all the types of actions that
are included within the term 'discrimination' as was done with in Titles I
and III, because this title essentially and simply extends the anti-
discrimination prohibition embodied in section 504 [of the Rehabilitation
Act] to all actions of state and local governments."35
The elements of a Title II claim are also modeled after section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. To succeed on a Title II ADA claim, the plaintiff
must establish:
(1) That the plaintiff is, or represents the interests of a "quali-
fied individual with a disability";
(2) That such individual was either excluded from participation
in or denied benefits of some public entity's services, programs
or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against; and
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994); 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1994).
32. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(2) (2000).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
34. See Nathanson v. Med. College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
35. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(pr.2), at 84 (1990).
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(3) That such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was
36by reason of plaintiff's disability.
A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined by the ADA as a
person with a disability "[w]ho, with or without reasonable modifications
to rules, policies or practices... meets the essential eligibility require-
ments for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activi-
ties provided by the public entity., 37 Under the ADA, a "disability" is de-
fined as: a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of the individual; a record of such impairment;
or being regarded as having such an impairment.38 Under the DOJ's im-
plementing regulations, a "physical or mental impairment" includes, "any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one of more of the following bodily systems: [n]eurological,
muskuloskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech or-
gans), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin and endocrine."'3 9
Of particular relevance to an ADA cause of action is that Title II re-
quires public entities to make reasonable accommodations to their poli-
cies, practices, and procedures where it is necessary to avoid discrimina-
tion on the basis of a disability.40 Reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, and procedures are required in order to avoid discrimination,
"unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program or activ-
ity."'4' In light of the federal-state scheme of many environmental statutes,
making reasonable accommodations could be difficult. The following dis-
cussion of one such scheme is warranted.
B. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act ("CAA"), enacted in 1970, established a compre-
36. Heather K. by Anita K. v. City of Mallard, 946 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 (N.D.
Iowa 1996).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (employing the same definition used by the
Rehabilitation Act); see 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (1994).
39. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2000).
40. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2000).
41. Id.
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hensive federal program to address the problem of air pollution.42 Despite
the fact that Congress federalized air pollution control, it did so recogniz-
ing the need for balance between the states and the federal government.43
As a result, implementation of the CAA is the joint responsibility of the
federal government and the states.44 States implement the CAA either
through "state implementation plans" ("SIP") or through independent
state statutes.
The CAA provides numerous methods of enforcement. Sanctions may
be imposed against a state for not complying with SIP requirements 6.4 For
states that fail to meet such requirements, the EPA has two years to
promulgate a federal implementation plan in lieu of the states' plans.47 In
48addition, regulated sources are subject to enforcement under the CAA .
With regard to noncompliance with pollution requirements, the EPA
must notify both the violator and the state in which the violation occurs.
The EPA has the authority to order compliance, or it may bring a civil ac-
tion to enforce compliance if the violation is not rectified.49 The CAA
also contains citizen suit provisions whereby any person may bring a civil
action against a violator, the administrator of the EPA, or the state or
federal government in order to enforce compliance. °
The fundamental goal of the CAA is the nationwide attainment and
maintenance of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS").51 Under the NAAQS scheme, "the states and the Federal
42. See 42 U.S.C §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (1994).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(m), 7509(b) (1994).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1994).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1994).
49. See id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994). In order to utilize the citizen suit provision, the
person(s) must send a notice to the violator sixty days before filing the suit so as to
enable the violator to come into compliance or for the government to decide to
pursue the violator. Citizens may also sue for past violations if there is a reason-
able belief that the violations will recur in the future. One restriction in the citizen
suit provision is that a citizen is barred from action if the government is in the
process of diligently prosecuting the suit. Id.
51. See 42 U.S.C § 7401(b)(1) (1994). One of the key purposes of the CAA
and the NAAQS is "to protect and enhance the quality of the nation's air re-
2001]
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Government [are] partners in the struggle against air pollution.5 2 The
EPA is required to establish both primary and secondary NAAQS for
"criteria pollutants."53 Criteria pollutants are those pollutants that the
EPA determines may jeopardize the public health or welfare. 4 The pri-
mary NAAQS are the acceptable concentration of a pollutant in the am-
bient air measured over a designated time that will protect the public with
an "adequate margin of safety."55 Secondary NAAQS are set at a level to1 6
protect the public welfare. The EPA is authorized not only to establish,
but also to review and revise the NAAQS every five years."
Once a NAAQS is established, it is up to the states to select and im-
plement the pollution control measures and to attain them by statutory
deadlines." The entire nation is divided into air quality control regions
and each State must subsequently designate its air quality control regions
as meeting ("attainment") or not meeting ("non-attainment") the
NAAQS 0 For those areas designated as non-attainment, states must
develop a state implementation plan ("SIP") which sets emission limits
imposed to control emissions from specific stationary sources in order to
attain the NAAQS. 61 The plans are to provide for attainment as "expedi-
tiously as practicable, but no later than [five] years from the date... [of• 63
designation].62 Once a SIP is submitted, the EPA must approve it.63 How-
ever, the EPA's discretion is limited.6
sources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity
of its population." Id.
52. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1); See also 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2000). (The current
criteria pollutants are: sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone,
particulate matter, and lead).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
56. See id. § 7409(b)(2).
57. See id. § 7409(d)(1).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(b).
60. See 42 U.S.C. H8 7407(d)(1)(A)(i), (ii).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
64. In Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269 (1976), the Court stated that
"Congress plainly left with the states•.. the power to determine which sources
would be burdened by regulation and to what extent."
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C. Washington's Clean Air Act
Washington State's clean air program will be used as an example for
the purposes of this Note because its program has come under recent• 65
scrutiny. Joining the federal government in the battle for clean air,
Washington State has enacted its own Clean Air Act.66 The purpose of
the Washington act is to ensure that the health and safety of persons vul-
nerable to the effects of pollution are protected.67
Since agricultural harvesting plays a prominent role in Washington's
economy, the state legislature developed a program to regulate agricul-
tural burning. The Washington Department of Ecology ("Department")
is empowered to establish general criteria allowing for the issuance of
permits for agricultural burning activities.6 For each permit issued, the
Department must take into account safety and property considerations as
69well as the public interests in reducing air, water, and land pollution.
Further, the Department conditions the issuance of its agricultural burn-
ing permits on a number of considerations such as: the air quality condi-
tions of the area where the burning will occur; the time of the year; the
meteorological conditions; the size and duration of the burning; the type
and amount of vegetative material to be burned; the applicant's need to
carry out such burning; the existence of extreme burning activities; the
risk of escape of fire onto another's property; and the public's interest in
65. See Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d.
96 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
66. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.94.010-990 (West 1992 Supp. 2001).
67. It is declared to be the public policy to preserve, protect, and enhance
the
air quality for current and future generations. Air is an essential resource
that must be protected from harmful levels of pollution. Improving air
quality is a matter of statewide concern and is in the public interest. It is the
intent of this chapter to secure and maintain levels of air quality that protect
human health and safety, including the most sensitive members of the popu
lation, to comply with the requirements of the federal clean air act, to
prevent injury to plant, animal life and property, to foster the comfort and
convenience of Washington's inhabitants, to promote the economic and
so
cial development of the state, and to facilitate the enjoyment of the natural
attractions of the state.
Id. § 70.94.011.
68. See id. § 70.94.650(1) (c).
69. See id.
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the environment.70 Since agricultural burning, like other air emissions, is a
legal, albeit regulated, activity, there is very little case law interpreting
and testing its existence, scope, and extent.
D. Case Law
Although case law interpreting the ADA is rapidly maturing, conflict
between it and other federal statutes is still in an embryonic stage.71 The
first case challenging the implementation of an environmental law by rely-
ing on the ADA was Heather K, by Anita K v. City of Mallard.71 In that
case, a child with severe respiratory and cardiac conditions sought to per-
manently enjoin exceptions to the city's general ban on open burning.73
Even though the city neither burned yard waste nor required its citizens
to do so, the court determined that the city may be liable under the ADA
for its regulation of open burning.74 Reasoning that the city's ordinance
had a discriminatory effect on the ability of persons with disabilities to
take advantage of city services, programs, or facilities, the court found
that the plaintiff raised an issue of material fact precluding the city's
summary judgment motion. 75 The court also held that the city's regulation
of open burning constituted a "program, service or activity" under the
ADA. 76 The plaintiff in City of Mallard also met the definition of a person
70. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-430-070 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
71. The Supreme Court is granting certiorari to an increasing number of
ADA cases. One author writes that:
The Supreme Court has also not been overly receptive to arguments in
ADA cases. In 1998 it issued a trio of decisions, the gist of which was
that in determining if a person was a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADA, it was appropriate to see if the person was substantially
impaired when corrective measures were considered. These were cases
of individuals with vision impairments and high blood pressure. The Su-
preme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims in which the federal govern-
ment, led by the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commision],
concurred that coverage of the individuals should be determined without
considering corrective measures.
Charles D. Goldman, High-Profile Civil Rights, EXEC. UPDATE, Nov.
2000, at 32.
72. See 946 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
73. See id. at 1375, 1376.
74. See id. at 1389.
75. See id. at 1386, 1387.
76. See id. at 1389. A "program or activity" includes "all of the operations of
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with a disability since her asthma constitutes a physical impairment that
substantially limits one of her major life activities.77
Although City of Mallard was the first to use the ADA in a challenge to
activities regulated by environmental law, it should not be considered
controlling. In denying the city's motion for summary judgment, the court
limited its holding to the specific facts of the case - the required elements
for an ADA claim. Therefore, the court did not address any of the con-
flicts between the ADA and the city's ordinance. Even in its discussion of
the requirement to make reasonable accommodations to the challenged
ordinance, the offered no suggestions on how to make such accommoda-
tions by stating that it is a question of fact not amenable to summary dis-.• 78
position. As a result, this case may be considered the first of its type,
though not influential on larger issues created by use of the ADA in this
fashion.
In 1999, a case was filed in Washington State putting the ADA directly
at odds with the federal CAA. 79 The case involved the issuance of air
permits granted under the Washington Clean Air Act for the burning of
wheat field stubble, and the adverse "discriminatory" effects of the burn-
a department, agency, or other instrumentality of a state or local government re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Additionally, breathing is
considered a major life activity.
Asthma is a chronic inflammatory disorder in which many cells play a role,
in particular mast cells, eosinophils and T lymphocytes. In susceptible indi-
viduals this inflammation causes recurrent episodes of wheezing, breath-
lessness, chest tightness and cough particularly at night and/or in the early
morning. These symptoms are usually associated with widespread but vari-
able airflow limitation that is at least partly reversible either spontaneously
or with treatment. The inflammation also causes an associated increase in
airway responsiveness to a variety of stimuli.
THE AM. MED. ASS'N, MEDICAL LIBRARY, available at http://www.medem.com/
MedLB/articledetaillb.cfm?articleID=ZZZSLQTU18C&sub _cat=80 (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2001); see also 28 C.F.R § 35.104(4)(2) (2000).
77. See 28 C.F.R § 35.104(4)(2) (2000).
78. City of Mallard, 946 F. Supp. at 1390. See also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S.
581, 606 n.16 (1999). "The Supreme Court has suggested that in determining
whether an accommodation is reasonable, it would include consideration of 'un-
due hardship' such as the costs of the modification, the budget of the program or
activity, and the overall size and type of the program.".
79. Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896
(E.D. Wash. 1999).
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ing on people with asthma covered under the ADA.&° The facts of the case
are similar to Heather K:
[Save our Summers ("SOS")] and two children, one with asthma
and one with cystic fibrosis, are seeking to stop the practice of
burning off stubble in harvested wheat fields in eastern Wash-
ington State.
The large quantities of smoke produced by the burning forces
the children to stay indoors, keeping them away from school,
and off roads and other public accommodations .... This, they
argue, violates their rights under ADA.
The stubble burning is conducted under permits issued by the
Washington Department of Ecology. Under Washington law,
the permits are required to minimize air pollution and can be
denied under adverse weather conditions.
The plaintiffs brought suit against the Washington Department of
Ecology, under the ADA, seeking a preliminary injunction against the is-
suance of further crop burning permits."' The court denied the injunction
83on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the suit. Plaintiffs then
moved for reconsideration of the lawsuit after which, on December 6,
1999, the court requested that the DOJ file an amicus curiae brief to ad-
dress:
(1) whether the comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme
of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),84 including private remedies,
forecloses plaintiffs claims under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act8' and
(2) whether the objectives and remedies of the ADA and RA
[Rehabilitation Act] can be reconciled with CAA's standards
that are the result of "compromise and consensus." 81
80. Steve Cook, EPA's Browner Says Disabilities Act Should Not Conflict




83. Save Our Summers, 132 F. Supp. 2d. 896; see also Protestors Tell of Field
Burning Woes, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct.18, 1999, available at 1999 WL 30984921.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1994).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). The plaintiffs also raise a claim under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994).
86. Save Our Summers v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, No. CS-99-269-RHW
(E.D. Wash. 2000) (order requesting United States as amicus curiae).
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The DOJ filed its brief on September 6, 2000, urging the court to find
that the ADA and federal CAA be read harmoniously in order to simplify
the reconciliation of the two statutes.87 If the court finds a discriminatory
effect of the Washington statute, then reasonable accommodations, not
fundamental alterations, must be made to the statute. The DOJ cau-
tioned, however, that the "remedies available under the ADA may need
to be modified to avoid conflict with the CAA scheme." 88 In addressing
this issue, the DOJ stated that in identifying remedies, the court must take
into account the purposes and policies of both the federal and state Clean
Air Acts.89 Responding to the DOJ brief, the court ruled that the broad
sweep of the federal Clean Air Act did not prevent the children from ad-
dressing air pollution under the ADA, thus clearing the way for trial.9
II. IMPACT AND ANALYSIS-USING THE SOS CASE AS A GUIDE
The potential impact of using the ADA in a way that conflicts with en-
vironmental policies, such as the CAA, could create a "legal train wreck"
due to the difficulty of reconciling statutes with fundamentally different
goals.91 Although the DOJ opines that the ADA and CAA should be
read harmoniously, it provides absolutely no guidance as to how to craft a
remedy that takes into account the purposes of the controlling statutes
without imposing fundamental alterations to the Washington Clean Air
Act. Aside from difficulty in determining a legal remedy, the court's
87. See Brief Amici Curiae of the United States at 2, Save Our Summers v.
Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (No. CS-99-
269-RHW).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 25.
90. Frater, supra note 20 at 3167. SOS also filed a case in the state of Idaho
challenging that state's agricultural burning program. See Save Our Summers v.
State of Idaho (No. 00-CV-430-N-EJL D. Idaho, 2000). This case was stayed until
the Supreme Court ruled on the then pending case of Board of Trustees of Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1669
(2000). See Save Our Summers v. State of Idaho (Order Staying Proceedings).
Once the Supreme Court ruled on Garrett (analyzed later in this Note), the Idaho
District Court denied the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction and tem-
porary restraining order. The Court also dismissed the case as to claims for
money damages in accordance with Garrett. See Save Our Summers, No. 00-430-
N-EJL (D. Idaho, 2001) ( order denying plaintiffs' motion).
91. Frater, supra note 20, at 3167.
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original order denying the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining
order raised numerous arguments questioning the use of the ADA when
it conflicts with other statutes. 92 Several of these arguments will be dis-
cussed below.93
A. Comprehensive Scheme of Environmental Statutes
The comprehensive scheme of the federal Clean Air Act, like other en-
vironmental statutes, should be enough to prevent an alternative cause of
action. In Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers
Ass'n.,94 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the presence of a comprehen-
sive remedial scheme within a federal environmental statute forecloses
resorting to remedies beyond those contained in the statute itself.95 In Sea
Clammers, the Court considered whether the plaintiffs could file a statu-
tory civil rights claim" to recover damages under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The plaintiffs erroneously sought to enforce the standards set
forth in the CWA through another statute, even though the CWA con-
tained its own statutory enforcement mechanisms. In making its determi-
92. See Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d
896 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
93. It is important to note that these arguments are raised in light of the fact
that the court found the plaintiffs did in fact raise a prima facia case under the
ADA. To raise a prima facia case, a plaintiff must establish: that the plaintiff is, or
represents the interests of, a "qualified individual with a disability;" that such indi-
vidual was either excluded from participation in or denied benefits of some public
entity's services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against;
and that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of
plaintiff's disability. See City of Mallard, 964 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 (N.D. Iowa
1996).
In SOS, the plaintiffs have asthma and cystic fibrosis, both recognized as disabili-
ties under the ADA. Meeting the second prong, plaintiffs were denied access to
public roads and even school. Lastly, plaintiffs meet the third prong by establish-
ing that the plaintiffs were denied "meaningful" access. This prong is met since
one of the plaintiffs had to leave town during burning season while the other
could not even visit the family doctor. See Save Our Summers, 132 F. Supp.
2d. at 907.
94. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
95. Id. at 20.
96. The statute used was 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This statute creates a pri-
vate cause of action for the deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured
under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
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nation, the Court found it significant that the CWA contains extensive en-
forcement provisions, including citizen suit provisions.97 The Court's
rationale was that the use of section 1983 would circumvent the intent of
Congress by allowing only certain remedies and not others when imple-
menting the CWA. 9 The existence of citizen suit provisions makes it less
likely that Congress intended to provide for alternative private rights of
action.99
Like the CWA, the CAA has an extensive remedial scheme that au-
thorizes private causes of action. Any person may bring a civil action
against a violator, or against the state or federal governments to enjoin or
enforce compliance. The person or persons bringing the suit must first
provide notice to the violator or the government sixty days before filing
the suit.'° It is possible that during this sixty day period either the viola-
tor will comply with the statute or the government will pursue enforce-
ment, thus eliminating the need for the suit. Circumvention of the provi-
sion upsets the delicate balance between industry and public health.'°1
The legislative history of the CAA's citizen suit provision indicates that
Congress intended to encourage "citizen participation in the enforcement
of standards and regulations established under this Act."'102 Allowing a
claim to proceed under the ADA would be a circumvention of the CAA's
provisions for citizen participation and be inconsistent with congressional
intent. The CAA's comprehensive remedial scheme should foreclose any
challenge arising under the ADA.
In its amicus brief, the DOJ opines that the Sea Clammers analysis is
not applicable to the situation in Save our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't
of Ecology.1°3 In the DOJ's opinion, the application of the Sea Clammers
analysis should be restricted to cases arising under 42 U.S.C. section
1983.104 Its rationale is that section 1983
97. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13-14.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 20.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1) (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1994).
101. Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896,
903 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
102. Id. at 903. (citing S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 36 (1970)).
103. See Brief Amici Curiae of the United States, at 13-14, Save Our Sum-
mers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (No.
CS-99-269-RHW).
104. See id. at 14.
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provides a vehicle for plaintiffs to assert violations of federal
law; it does not create a substantive right that exists independent
of the statute in issue. In contrast, the ADA and the RA (and
certainly other disability discrimination statutes) provide protec-
tions against discrimination on the basis of disability that are
governed by specific substantive standards and are independent
of other federal protections.
The DOJ further distinguishes Sea Clammers by noting that the Court
did not attempt to reconcile the statutes at issue.'O Rather, the SOS
court's analysis focused exclusively on the remedial scheme of the CWA.
The DOJ also points out that this analysis has not been applied outside
the context of section 1983 cases since that provision is unique in that it
provides "an enforcement mechanism for substantive rights defined in
another statute."'' 7 The essence of the DOJ's argument is that in cases
involving section 1983, there are not two distinct statutory schemes that
could be reconciled. By contrast, the ADA contains substantive rights
separate and independent from the CAA and also provides a means of
enforcing those rights.1°8 As such, the DOJ urges the court to reconcile
the statutes in conflict; however, the DOJ provides absolutely no guidance
as to how to this should be done.
B. Violation of the Eleventh Amendment's Sovereign Immunity
Clause
Another argument weighing heavily against the use of the ADA as a
tool to challenge environmental policy is based on the constitutionality of
the ADA itself. Relying on several Supreme Court decisions in which
other civil rights statutes were found to violate the Eleventh Amend-





109. U.S. CONST. amend XVI;
In a series of decisions that involved diverse issues during the past dec-
ade, the Supreme Court has been extremely receptive when states have
argued "sovereign immunity." In 1996 it held that the state of Florida
could not be sued by Seminole Native Americans in a case involving in-
terpretation of a statute, what is known legalistically as "federal ques-
tion" jurisdiction. This was followed a few years later by Alden v. Maine,
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asked to consider whether the ADA is in contravention of the Eleventh
Amendment's Sovereign Immunity Clause." ° In Board of Trustees of
Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars suits filed under Title I of the ADA, which deals with the em-
ployment practices of employers including states."' The case was decided
on the basis of complaints arising under Title I despite the fact that re-
spondents' alleged violations of both Title I and Title II of the ADA."2
Although the Court limited its decision to the Title I complaints, the same
analysis is used in numerous Eleventh Amendment cases and, accord-
ingly, may be used to challenge the constitutional validity of Title II of the
ADA." 3
The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) in which the Supreme Court held that states could not
be sued for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (minimum wage).
Charles D. Goldman, High Profile Civil Rights, EXEC. UPDATE, Nov. 2000, at 33.
110. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
111. See id. at 960; See also Nancy Montwieler, States Immune from ADA
Challenges, U.S. Supreme Court Rules in 5-4 Decision. 36 BNA DAILY REPORT
FOR EXECUTIVES., Feb. 22, 2001, at A-39.
The case began in 1997 when plaintiffs Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash
filed separate ADA suits against the state. Garrett charged that she was
demoted from her job as a nurse at the University of Alabama at Bir-
mingham because she was regarded as disabled because of her cancer his-
tory. Ash, a correctional officer, contended that the Alabama Depart-
ment of Human Services provided inadequate accommodation for his
asthma.
112. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960 n.1.
Though the briefs of the parties discuss both sections in their constitu-
tional arguments, no party has briefed the question of whether Title II of
the ADA, dealing with the "services, programs, or activities of a public
entity," 42 U.S.C. §12132, is available for claims of employment discrimi-
nation when Title I of the ADA expressly deals with the subject (citations
omitted) .... We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue
whether Title 1I, which has somewhat different remedial provisions from
Title I, is appropriate legislation under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
when the parties have not favored us with briefing on the statutory ques-
tion.
Id.
113. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711-712 (1999) challenged provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act [29 U.S.C.A §§ 216(b), 203(x)].
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commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." '114 A for-
malistic interpretation of the Amendment limits its application to suits
against States from citizens of other states, yet the judiciary has extended
its applicability to citizens residing in the same State."' Ultimately, the
guarantee of the Amendment is that private individuals in federal court
may not sue non-consenting states." 6 Regardless, Congress may still ab-
rogate a State's sovereign immunity if it unequivocally intends to do so
and acts pursuant to a valid grant of power under the Constitution."7 The
key issue, as in Garrett, is whether Congress acted within constitutional
authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the ADA. 8
In determining the validity of an Eleventh Amendment abrogation, the
Supreme Court has found that the enforcement provisions of section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment limit the principle of state sovereignty." 9 As
such, the Court has determined that Congress may subject a non-
consenting state to suit in federal court when it is exercising its enforce-
ment power granted under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Congress fre-
quently relies on this power to escape Eleventh Amendment restrictions,
such as it did with the ADA, to enforce section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 Section 1 states in pertinent part:
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
115. See Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000).
116. See id. at 73.
117. See id. In Garrett, the Court stated that the first requirement is not in
dispute based on language in the ADA. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962. "A State
shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the
United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdic-
tion for a violation of this chapter." See Garrett, at 962 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202).
118. It is important to note that the Eleventh Amendment argument was not
available in Heather K because the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to local
governments. The Garrett Court stated that "[Tjhe Eleventh Amendment does
not extend its immunity to units of local government." Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965
(citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).
119. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
120. See id. "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Congress in-
tended to use this power in enacting the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4)
(1994).
121. "It is clear that Congress intended to invoke § 5 as one of its bases for
enacting the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4)." Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962 n.3.
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No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to an2 person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws.
In enforcing the provisions of section 1, the Court developed a test to
determine whether legislation exceeds the scope of the protections pro-
vided by the Fourteenth Amendment. The test requires that there be
"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.,
123
In applying the Fourteenth Amendment analysis to the ADA, an ex-
amination of the Amendment's restrictions to the way in which states
treat the disabled must also follow. Such an examination flows from the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation
relying on enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause hinges upon
whether the class of persons being protected qualifies as a "suspect class."
Applicable to the ADA, the Court determined that mental retardation• 125
does not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. As a result, cases
involving allegations of state discrimination of the mentally retarded are
subject to the minimum "rational-basis" level of judicial s ." 126subecttotheminmu r n b l  jdicalscrutnny. In re-
jecting the classification of the mentally retarded as "quasi-suspect," the
Court actually expanded the class beyond the mentally disabled by stating
that:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect.., it would be difficult to find a princi-
pled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have per-
haps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses,
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part
Contra Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000). Court dismissed ADA Ti-
tle II claim from case for lack of jurisdiction. Walker at 347. The Court found that
the ADA was based on the Commerce Clause and thus, states are not subjected to
private litigation in federal court based on Eleventh Amendment. Walker at 346.
The Court reasoned however, that legislation based on Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment supports private litigation. Walker at 346.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
123. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997).
124. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963.
125. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
126. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
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of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the
aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are re-
luctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so.127
In Garrett, the Court stated that:
Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses "distin-
guishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the au-
thority to implement," a State's decision to act on the basis of
those differences does not give rise to a constitutional violation.
Id. at 441 [Cleburne]. Such a classification cannot run afoul of
the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship
between the disparity of the treatment and some legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose.
As such, Cleburne holds that "states are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled so long as
their actions ... are rational.
1 29
Furthermore, the Court also held that in order to invoke its section 5
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must identify a pat-
tern of unconstitutional discrimination against the class of persons subject
to the challenged legislation. As a result, the constitutionality of the
ADA's circumvention of the Eleventh Amendment is determined by
whether Congress adequately identified a pattern of unconstitutional dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities by the several states. In
Garrett, the Court notes that the ADA's legislative record fails to show a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment (Title I) against
the disabled." In addition, the Court goes on to note that:
Congress made a general finding in the ADA that 'historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with dis-
abilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem'... The record assembled
by Congress includes many instances to support such a finding.
But the great majority of these incidents do not deal with the ac-
tivities of States.
127. Id. at 445-46.
128. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963, 964. (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 964.
130. See id. at 965.
131. Id. (emphasis added). [Emphasis was added to highlight that the finding
is not limited only to employment practices governed under Title I of the ADA.
The Court acknowledges, as does Justice Breyer's dissent, that some instances of
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Consequently, the Court concluded that Congress failed to identify a
pattern of discrimination by the states that constituted a violation the
Fourteenth Amendment and, as a result, failed to justify the ADA as a
remedy that is congruent and proportional to the identified discrimina-
tion."' The Eleventh Amendment was unconstitutionally abrogated by
Title I of the ADA.
The same analysis is directly applicable to Title II. By relying on gen-
eral findings of discrimination in society, not specifically on states' dis-
criminatory activities, Congress again failed to identify a pattern of state
discrimination against persons with disabilities in dealing with state ser-
vices, programs, or activities. Furthermore, in accordance with Cleburne,
states may discriminate on the basis of disability if such classification is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Applying this terminology
to states' implementation of environmental laws, such as Washington and
Idaho's implementation of the CAA, states do in fact have sound and ra-
tional bases for enacting and implementing environmental policies - the
goal of eliminating the adverse health effects of pollution for society as a
whole - including those that are disabled. Even, if implementation of
federal environmental statutes results in adverse impacts to the dis-
abled-as the SOS complaint results from the issuance of agricultural
burning permits "[t]he failure of a State to revise policies now seen as in-
correct under a new understanding of proper policy does not always con-
stitute the purposeful and intentional action required to make out a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause." '133 These rational bases that justify
environmental schemes, such as the state of Washington's agricultural
burning program, are embedded deeply within the federal CAA and
Washington's statutory equivalent.' Accordingly, Congress can reasona-
state discrimination are mentioned in the legislative history. Id. at 966-67. How-
ever, the Court dismisses these examples by questioning the context in which they
were cited and noting that even if unconstitutional actions determined, "... these
incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitu-
tional discrimination on which section 5 legislation must be based." Id. at 965.];
See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
132. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967, 968.
133. Id. at 968. (Kennedy, J. concurring.).
134. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994). The purpose of the Clean Air
Act is to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare ...... Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)
(1994) (ensuring that air quality will protect with an adequate margin of safety);
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (1994) (stating secondary NAAQS standard is to protect
2001]
346 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:323
bly be determined to have unconstitutionally abrogated the Eleventh
Amendment when it enacted Title II of the ADA. It follows that any
claims arising under Title II of the ADA for state discriminatory practices
based on implementation of federal environmental law cannot succeed
under the Equal Protection Clause..
C. Environmental Policy is the Result of Comprehensive Multi-
Stakeholder Negotiation
Another argument weighing against the use of the ADA in challenges
to the CAA and other environmental laws asserts that environmental pol-
icy is the result of an extensive and comprehensive negotiation and devel-
opment process.
135
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 136 sets the framework by
which federal agencies develop policy, including environmental standards
such as NAAQSs. Basic procedural requirements for rulemakings are
listed in section 553 of the APA. The rulemaking process must: specify
that the agency is giving interested parties not less than thirty days to par-
ticipate in the rulemaking through submission of comments, and, when
required by statute, in a public hearing; and the agency must consider
these comments and include in the final rule a general statement of their
basis and purpose. 13 As such, bringing an environmental action to court
based on an ADA claim would circumvent the regulated industry's cer-
tainty in the legality of their activities. However, this would create a dom-
the public welfare). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.011 (1992) (stating that
the purpose of the Washington Clean Air Act is to "secure and maintain levels of
air quality that protect human health and safety, including the most sensitive
members of the population). Id.
135. After numerous hearings and extensive research done at the legislative
level in developing the statutes, Congress delegates the implementation of the
statutes to administrative agencies. The agencies then promulgate rules and regu-
lations that more specifically detail legal obligations, implementation and en-
forcement. The development of these environmental regulations is the culmina-
tion of a finely choreographed process involving vast input from a diverse group of
stakeholders including industry, government, special interest groups and the pub-
lic.
136. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
137. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c), (d) (2000). Other requirements include (1) a no-
tice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register; (2) reference to the legal au-
thority under which it is proposed; and (3) a description of the substance of the
rule.
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ino effect impacting government as well.
When analyzing the comprehensive nature of environmental statutes
such as the CAA, the important role of the states must not be overlooked.
As previously stated, the CAA makes the states and the federal govern-
ment "partners in the struggle against air pollution."'38 The role of the
federal government, under the auspices of the EPA, is to develop and en-
force the NAAQS 3 9 However, the development and implementation of
air quality controls resides exclusively with the states.14° In fact, courts
have protected this discretion by stating that the EPA has "no authority
to question the wisdom of a state's choices of emission limitations if they
are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of section 110(a)(2).''
Furthermore, a State's discretion in developing and implementing meas-
ures to reach attainment does not exclude the adoption of more stringent
NAAQS.' 42 The only stipulation is that SIPs must be approved by the
EPA before they go into effect. For example, Washington State's SIP for
particulate matter has been approved by the EPA.14 ' However, if it is de-
termined that the ADA is a super-statute that trumps environmental laws,
"the failure of any local or state government to guarantee pristine air, by
eliminating all emissions from sources such as automobiles, industrial fa-
cilities, farming, and households, would arguably be a violation of the
ADA."' " Such an outcome would change the states' role in fighting pol-
lution from that of partner to one bearing liability.
D. The Health of Vulnerable Persons is Already Protected Under the
Law
Contained in the carefully tailored development of the Clean Air Act
138. Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).
140. See Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269 (1976); ("Congress plainly
left with the States... the power to determine which sources would be burdened
by regulation and to what extent.").
141. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994).
143. Washington's Open Burning and Field Burning regulations were ap-
proved by EPA on September 17, 1990. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, REGION 10, TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR APPROVED WASHINGTON SIPs, at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/rlO/AIRPAGE.NSF/webpage/table+of+contents+for+app
roved+washington+sips (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
144. See Frater, supra note 20, at 3167.
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are requirements for the establishment of standards based on the health
needs of citizens, including sensitive citizens."' In the development of
NAAQS, the EPA is required to establish levels that are "requisite to
protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety."146 Sensi-
tive persons, such as asthmatics, are to be included within the group that
must be protected.1 47 Consideration of sensitive persons in the develop-
ment of NAAQS health standards is also addressed in the CAA's legisla-
tive history. "NAAQS must protect not only average healthy individuals,
but also 'sensitive citizens'-children, for example, or people with asthma,
emphysema, or other conditions rendering them particularly vulnerable to
air pollution."' " As such, the EPA sets its national standards with a focus
on public health-thus taking into account the needs of vulnerable sub-
149
populations.
The consideration and protection of the health of sensitive persons is
expressly detailed in the challenged Washington statute in Save our Sum-
mers. In fact, the Washington Clean Air Act goes even farther by protect-
145. The first listed purpose of the federal CAA is "to protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994).
146. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
147. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
148. Brief Amici Curiae of the United States at 19, Save Our Summers v.
Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Wash. 1999) ( No. CS-99-
269-RHW) (citing S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 10 (1970)).
149. The DOJ acknowledges this point in its Save Our Summers amicus brief
by pointing out that Congress stated that EPA need not consider the most sensi-
tive individuals within the vulnerable sub-populations. See Brief Amici Curiae of
the United States at 19, Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132
F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (No. CS-99-269-RHW). However, DOJ then
points to other excerpts in the legislative history indicating that the EPA must
consider the effects to a "representative sample of persons comprising the sensi-
tive group rather than to a single person in such a group." Id. Although the legis-
lative history does not explain this exclusion, one theory is that it is based on the
need to develop standards that are reasonable for both the protected class of per-
sons and the regulated community. This delicate balance may also reflect the vast
stakeholder input relied upon in the development of the Clean Air Act and the
need for this coordination in the development of NAAQSs. Apparently, the DOJ
is attempting to carve out some room for ADA claims to protect the "most sensi-
tive individual" referred to in the legislative history. Although this may be the
most "politically correct" result, it is inconsistent with the letter of the law and
congressional intent.
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ing the most vulnerable members of the population beyond the federal
requirements. Its stated purpose is to "secure and maintain levels of air
quality that protect human health and safety, including the most sensitive
members of the population."1
50
As the result of comprehensive air pollution programs at both the fed-
eral and state levels, the concerns of sensitive individuals are in fact taken
into account in the development of air quality standards. Reliance on this
comprehensive structure is further supported by the well-established rule
of statutory construction that where two statutes touch upon the same
area, the more specific statute controls the terms of the more general
one.151 Proponents of this argument conclude that any efforts to use the
ADA to circumvent the CAA cannot be countenanced.
E. Finding a Reasonable Accommodation
A final argument that can be raised to prevent the use of the ADA in
environmental cases is the difficult task of finding a reasonable accommo-
dation. As previously noted, the ADA requires public entities to make
reasonable accommodations to their usual policies, practices, and proce-
dures when necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.
These modifications are required unless the entity can demonstrate that
they (the modifications) would fundamentally alter the nature of the ser-
vice."' In SOS, the DOJ urges the court to read the two statutes together
harmoniously, but cautions that remedies available under the ADA (e.g.,
reasonable accommodations) may need to be modified to avoid conflict
with the CAA scheme. However, the DOJ passes this daunting task
onto the lower court by stating that "[g]iven the early posture of the re-
cord, the scant evidence on possible modifications does not render feasi-
ble a fair and complete analysis at this point." '155 With no guidance from
the DOJ, courts are essentially left with all of the pieces but without in-
150. Washington Clean Air Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.011 (1992) (em-
phasis added).
151. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973).
152. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2000).
153. See id.
154. See Brief Amici Curiae of the United States at 2, Save Our Summers v.
Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Wash. 1999) ( No. CS-99-
269-RHW).
155. Id. at 25.
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structions.
Courts have determined that the test for "reasonable accommodation"
must be made on a case-by-case basis.'56 Factors to consider in determin-
ing whether an accommodation is "reasonable" may include the costs of
the modification, the budget of the program or activity, and the overall
size and type of the program.57 To add to this list, the DOJ also suggests
looking at the purposes and policies underlying the state's clean air pro-
158
gram.
Determining a "reasonable" alternative without fundamentally altering
the nature of the services provided would essentially put the CAA and the
ADA completely at odds with one another. This is especially the case
when a state program has been carefully crafted and thus implicitly incor-
porates provisions that could already be considered reasonable accom-
modations, or allows options providing for the development of alterna-
tives under the existing programs. For example, the Washington program
was developed to comply with EPA established NAAQS health stan-
dards. The Washington Code states that:
As implemented by regulation, the State's agricultural burning
permit program seeks to 'establish controls for agricultural
burning in the state in order to minimize adverse health and the
environmental effects from agricultural burning' and to develop
'economically feasible alternative methods to agricultural burn-
ing.' Wash. Admin. Code § 173-430-010 (1999). The permit pro-
gram regulations further provide that '[a]gricultural burning is
allowed when it is reasonably necessary to carry out the enter-
prise. A farmer can show it is reasonably necessary when it
meets the criteria of the best management practices and no
practical alternative is reasonably available.' WASH. ADMIN.
CODE §173-430-040. "Best management practices" are those
156. See Staron v. McDonalds Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining what consti-
tutes reasonable modification is highly fact specific, requiring case-by-case in-
quiry.).
157. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 606 n.16 (1999).
158. Brief Amici Curiae of the United States at 24 n.19, Save Our Summers v.
Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Wash. 1999) ( No. CS-99-
269-RHW). The DOJ points to WASH. REV.CODE § 70.94.011 which states that
"[lIt is the policy of the state that costs of protecting the air resource and operat-
ing state and local air pollution control programs shall be shared as equitably as
possible among all sources whose emissions cause air pollution."
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practices for reducing air contaminant emissions from agricul-
tural activities as identified by a research task force established
by the State's Department of Ecology. WASH. REV. CODE §§
70.94.650(4).'
Furthermore, the Washington Act established an Agricultural Burning
Practices and Research Task Force to develop and revise best manage-
ment practices (BMPs) for agricultural burning.16° As such, use of the
ADA to challenge statutes such as Washington's is not necessary.
Relying on the flexibility of its program, the Washington Department
of Ecology, on January 12, 2001, denied a petition by Save Our Summers
to revise the Washington wheat stubble burning regulations.16' The rea-
son cited for the denial is that a "multi-faceted agricultural burning pro-
gram [is] already working." 162 The Department of Ecology notes that un-
der the existing program, compromises have been made including
161voluntary burning reductions by the area's farmers. Preliminary figures
showed that at least 12,000 fewer acres were burned in fall 2000 than in
fall 1999 - a thirteen percent drop.16 Furthermore, Department of Ecol-
ogy Director Tom Fitzsimmons stressed the State's commitment to human
health by stating, "We agree we need to figure out how and when wheat
stubble burning affects people's health .... [H]aving a clear answer to
that question will give us a more accurate goal for clean air in Eastern
159. Id. at 24 n.19.
160. WASH. DEPT. OF ECOL., AGRICULTURAL BURNING FOCUS SHEET, Aug.
1998 (98-1027-AQ) available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/981027aq.PDF (last
revised Aug. 1998). "The Task Force also sets permit fees, identifies research
needs and recommends research funding priorities to explore and test economical
and practical alternative practices to agricultural burning." Id. The Task Force is
comprised of members representing the farming community, conservation dis-
tricts, the state departments of Agriculture and Ecology, local air authorities, col-
lege or university agricultural specialists, and the public health or medical com-
munity. See id. The balanced composition of the task force indicates a reasonable
program that contains flexibility and discretion to ensure that every individual is
protected and that if the health of citizens is in jeopardy, reasonable efforts will be
made to ascertain alternatives within the confines of the air program.
161. Jani Gilbert, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, Ecology Dept. Denies
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Washington and over our State.""16  The Department is also pursuing
funding for a comprehensive study of how field burning affects human
health.166 As such, reasonable accommodations are already available with
more being pursued under existing law. Any changes requiring additional
actions would be duplicative or burdensome.
In light of the implicit incorporation of reasonable accommodations
and flexibility contained in the Washington program, any changes to the
status quo could be considered a fundamental alteration to the State's
programs. For example, a prohibition on agricultural burning would no
doubt constitute a fundamental alteration. In addition, such a proscrip-
tion would have serious environmental and economic ramifications.
Eliminating controlled burning would increase the potential for destruc-
tive wildfires thereby threatening long-term air quality. Additionally,
elimination of burning would likely require the use of chemicals and pes-
ticides to control insect populations and the spread of disease, thus in-
creasing the likelihood that individuals would be exposed to potentiallyS • • 167
toxic chemicals. Reliance on chemicals and pesticides would also in-
crease the economic burden on farmers who have come to rely on agricul-
tural burning as a cost-effective mechanism to ensure a healthy and hearty
crop yield.'6 Considering the undue hardship elements the Supreme
Court referred to in Olmstead, this option would likely constitute a fun-
damental alteration to the existing program.
Other options residing between an outright prohibition and maintain-
ing the status quo, include legion and alternatives for residual removal of
stubble such as incorporating the residue in the soil, seeding directly into
standing stubble using a "no-till" drill, or bailing and removing wheat
straw. 169 Though not expressly stated in the Code, these alternatives may
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Such exposure could be especially damaging to the very sensitive indi-
viduals they are trying to protect by eliminating burning activities.
168. See U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
AG CENTER, AGRICULTURAL BURNING, available at
http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ag/tburn.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2000).
169. Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896,
908-09 (E.D. Wash. 1999). Legion is the use of resistant/tolerant varieties of
wheat. See id at 908-09. Other alternatives include:
seeding date adjustment, adjustment of the seed rate and row spacing,
site specific crop rotation systems targeted to manage the specific pest or-
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well have been considered by implication by legislators vis-A-vis the Agri-
cultural Burning Practices and Research Task Force. Regardless, in light
of the CAA NAAQS requirements and Washington's implementing stat-
ute accounting for the health of sensitive individuals, an argument can be
proffered that reasonable accommodations have been made to comply
with ADA requirements and to protect the most sensitive individuals.
III. LOOKING AHEAD - A PRECEDENT RIPE FOR ABUSE
If courts treat the ADA as an extra-environmental enforcement tool,
such a precedent would be subject to gross misuse. Individuals and or-
ganizations alike would be provided a new opportunity to challenge the
strength and implementation of environmental laws. Challenges to a
state's implementation of the CAA would serve as a stepping-stone for
challenges to other environmental statutes. These challenges would
surely escalate because the ADA would provide standing to organizations
that are currently unable to challenge environmental laws absent non-
compliance by a covered entity or procedural mishap during regulatory
promulgation.
A. The ADA Expands the Class of Those with Standing to Challenge
Environmental Laws
Allowing environmentally-based ADA challenges may provide stand-
ing to organizations that otherwise are not be able to challenge an envi-
ronmental statute. For decades, numerous organizations have attempted
to challenge environmental policies on the ground that such laws inade-
quately protect the environment. The doctrine of standing ensures that a
suit in federal court is only brought by one who has a personal stake in the
outcome or one who has been injured by the other party. The standing
doctrine is rooted in the "case or controversies" requirement of the U.S.
Constitution. 70 To have standing, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered
"injury in fact," that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
ganism, use of crop-protection chemicals to minimize pest impacts, me-
chanical cultivation practices that provide pest control, site-specific iden-
tification of pests contributing to losses, inclusion of management systems
that will reduce or eliminate plant hosts that harbor inspects pests, and
review of the pest infestation with attention to all tools available with In-
tegrated Pest Management. Id. at 908-09.
170. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable de-
cision.'
To meet the first, and perhaps the most cumbersome prong, plaintiffs
challenging environmental laws must prove an injury in fact. This crite-
rion is particularly challenging in environmental cases due to limitations
imposed by the Supreme Court. In Sierra Club v. Morton,'72 the Court
held that the Sierra Club failed to establish an injury in fact based solelyS173
on its long-standing interest in defending the environment. The Court
required an allegation of specific harm to an individual or individuals that
actually used the area in question for recreational purposes. 74 Subse-
quent cases have restricted the injury in fact requirement further.
7
1
An additional hurdle under this prong is that courts typically do not
recognize general citizen standing. For example, a person may not have
standing to challenge a government action solely because that person is
not happy with the program or because that person is a taxpayer. 76 The
Supreme Court has allowed associational standing, so long as certain cri-
teria are met. The Court has stated that:
Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization
may sue to redress its members' injuries when: (a) its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the
171. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693,
704 (2000).
172. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
173. See id. at 735.
174. See id. at 740.
175. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (requiring
specific allegations of injury); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564
(1992) (requiring an environmental plaintiffs injury to be sufficiently imminent to
constitute injury in fact).
176. See, e.g., Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2001).
This concept was briefly discussed in a case involving the National Environmental
Policy Act. In rejecting the plaintiff's "taxpayer" standing argument, the court
stated that "[t]o establish standing in a... taxpayer suit under Article III, a plain-
tiff must allege a direct injury caused by the expenditure of tax dollars." Id.
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lawsuit.77
In essence, an organization may sue on behalf of its members only if
some of its members would have individual standing. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has held that individual members of the organizations
178need not take part in the presentation of the case.
These standards have limited the amount of claims arising under envi-
ronmental laws. Nonetheless, organizations could use the ADA as a pre-
text and thus overcome the standing requirements simply by recruiting
the membership of persons with disabilities. As a result, many environ-
mentalist groups would meet all of the elements of associational standing
vicariously through the "injury in fact" to the disabled member. Recruit-
ment of persons meeting the definition of "disabled" under the ADA
would create a mutually beneficial endeavor. The organization would
have standing in the suit and the disabled "member" would receive essen-
tially free legal representation for their claim. The results from this prac-
tice would be grossly inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. Us-
ing the ADA as a back door would be obtuse to integral Supreme Court
decisions such as Morton, and flood the courts with cases that would not
otherwise be heard. Furthermore, even if such cases were successful, the
result would require the development and promulgation of new policies
and programs. This practice could cost millions of dollars, take years of
dialogue to create and decades to fulfill.
B. Challenges to Other Air Provisions and Environmental Statutes
Once standing is established, ADA challenges to other environmental
statutes are likely to follow. With the CAA blazing the trail, virtually
every environmental statute with a state component or state partnership
arrangement would be targets of the environmentalist crusade. Under the
CAA, persons with asthma could sue a State for the issuance of air emis-
sion permits even in attainment zones. The CWA179 contains a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") program, by which
"point sources" may discharge into our nation's waters subject to permits180
with stipulated pollution controls. Under the CWA, states are responsi-
177. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977).
178. Id. (not requiring individual members to participate).
179. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1994).
180. See id. at § 1342(b).
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ble for the issuance of NPDES permits under an EPA approved pro-181
gram. Like the CAA, states also retain the authority to promulgate• .182
standards regulating water quality. In yet another similarity to the
CAA, the CWA has a comprehensive enforcement program comprised of
civil actions, criminal liability, and citizen suit provisions.
181
If courts allow the use of the ADA in CAA cases, the table would be
set for persons with disabilities to challenge a State's issuance of an
NPDES permit if that individual is exposed to and adversely effected by
the constituents in the permitted discharge. For example, a person claim-
ing to suffer from Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Disorder ("MCS")
could possibly challenge the continued issuance of NPDES permits if
regularly exposed to water discharges.
Continuing down the slippery slope, the ADA could very well become
a super-statute, trumping every environmental law that permits limited
releases to the environment - either via the air, water, or land.
181. See id.
182. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994).
183. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(3), (b), (c) (1994).
184. MCS is a highly controversial disorder. Some people believe that expo-
sure to a chemical or chemicals can trigger a symptom complex. Those symptoms
occur in many organ systems. No physical signs can be consistently linked be-
tween MCS patients, but symptoms include dizziness, nausea, shortened breath or
seizures. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITIES, at
http//:www.osha-slc.gov/SLTC/multiplechemicalsensitivities/index.html (last re-
vised Mar. 8, 2001).
185. "Multiple Chemical Sensitivity (MCS) has become one of the most con-
troversial medical theories considered by both state and federal courts." See Don
Evans & Mark Fitzsimmons, Judging Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Claims-The
Verdict Is In, 9 THE METRO. CORP. COUNSEL No. 2, at 27. Due to its inconclusive
diagnoses and foundation, courts have increasingly rejected the theory when
called upon to review expert testimony concerning the alleged syndrome. Id. Re-
lying on the "Daubert Test for Reliable Expert Testimony," construed in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), courts have concluded: (1) the
methodology to test for and to make a diagnosis of MCS has not been tested to
ensure its reliability, and may not be capable of testing; (2) that the lack of verifi-
able testing method gives rise to a high rate of error; (3) that peer review of MCS
medical literature has resulted in wide spread criticism and condemnation of the
methodology and diagnosis; and (4) that MCS is not a generally accepted medical
diagnosis supported by scientific findings. Id. at 27.
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CONCLUSION
Use of the ADA to circumvent environmental policy may become a
dangerous trend in environmental and health law. If successful, the po-
tential exists for the ADA to become the nation's most stringent and
comprehensive environmental statute. Even though both the Washington
and Idaho District Courts have denied motions to enjoin state permitting
activities, the table has been set for future clashes between the CAA and
the ADA. Questions also exist as to whether Garrett will prevent such
claims from being filed in the future because its strictures apply to ADA
actions seeking monetary damages-not equitable relief. Complicating
the issue further is the DOJ's commitment to seek "every opportunity to
maintain and expand the effectiveness of the ADA. The DOJ has fought
nationwide to uphold the constitutionality of ADA suits against states."
1 86
One would be hard pressed to find opposition the DOJ's mantra. How-
ever, such advancement must progress reasonably, thus not impeding
upon the effectiveness of our nation's existing environmental and health-
based statutes.
In light of the aforementioned issues, courts have a great opportunity
to ensure that environmental statutes are read "harmoniously" with the
ADA. The relationship between the laws should be one of synergy - not
conflict. Should courts allow environmentally-based ADA claims to pro-
ceed with statutes at odds with one another, the results could unreasona-
bly tip the delicate balance between the protection of human health and
sustainable development. The result could force the development of a
zero tolerance approach to environmental releases and cripple develop-
ments in chemistry, science, medicine and technology. In a strange twist
of fate, the very law providing a shield for Americans with disabilities
would actually be a sword prolonging, or even preventing, medical and
pharmacological advances.
186. See CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ENFORCING THE ADA:
LOOKING BACK ON A DECADE OF PROGRESS (2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/pubs/lOthrpt.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2001).
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